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Abstract—This paper investigates the possibility 
of creating an authentication system based on 
the measurements of the human brain. Dis-
cussed throughout will be an evaluation of the 
feasibility of brainwave authentication based on 
brain anatomy and behavior characteristics, 
conventional vs. dynamic authentication meth-
ods, the possibility of continuous authentication, 
and biometric ethical and security concerns. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Technology continues to permeate our daily 
lives, and with this expansion comes increasing 
cyber security concerns. Simple PINs and pass-
words are no longer enough to limit use to only the 
intended user. More complex means of authentica-
tion are required, and the way this can be accom-
plished is through behavior-based biometric secu-
rity. With approximately 100 billion neurons [17], 
each brain is identifiably unique in the way it reacts 
to and processes incoming information. It is this 
characteristic that can turn brainwaves into an au-
thentication metric. However, neurological infor-
mation is a growing and critical information class. 
The commerciality of neural devices is a contrib-
uting factor to this expansion with neural implants 
for clinical patients, at-home neurostimulators, and 
Brain-Computer Interfacing smartphone applica-
tions. A multitude of new access points carrying 
neural information has now been established and 
this continued multiplication in data extraction will 
lead to great strides in behavioral-biometrics, but 
also inevitable security and privacy concerns [28]. 
 
II.  THE BRAIN 
 
“If the human brain were so simple 
That we could understand it, 
We would be so simple 
That we couldn’t.” 
- Emerson M. Pugh [52] 
 At the center of human cognition is the brain, 
an electrochemical organ capable of generating as 
much as 10 watts of electrical power [76]. The brain 
is comprised of approximately 100 billion nerve 
cells known as neurons and is a complex system 
where mental states emerge from interactions be-
tween many functional and physical levels [17]. It 
can process immense amounts of information, and 
with such a complex structure, no one has yet to de-
crypt the whole picture on how precisely the brain 
works. Research suggests that at some point, the 
computational power of a computer will surpass 
that of the human brain. However, as we do not yet 
know how the entire brain computes, there is no fi-
nite answer for exactly how fast the brain works 
[63]. Despite the daunting complexity of this organ, 
growing an understanding of the brain is imperative 
to cracking authentication methods using brain-
waves. 
 Similar to the gates and wires of a computer, the 
neurons in a brain gather and transmit electrochem-
ical signals [19]. This electrical activity emanating 
from the brain manifests in the form of brainwaves. 
Brainwaves fall into four main categories—Beta 
waves, Alpha waves, Theta waves, and Delta waves 
[76]. 
i. Beta waves occur when the brain is actively 
engaged in mental activities such as a per-
son who is in active conversation. As the 
fastest of these brainwaves, Beta waves can 
be characterized as having a relatively low 
amplitude and frequency between 15 to 40 
cycles per second. 
ii. A person who has just finished a task and 
sits down to rest would be in an Alpha state. 
Alpha waves are slower and higher in am-
plitude, and describe a non-arousal state.  
iii. Theta waves are most common in a state 
where the task being completed has be-
come so automatic you disengage from be-
ing mentally focused on it. One example of 
this is when you are driving on the highway 
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and discover you can no longer remember 
your actions or thoughts for the last five 
miles. Theta waves often occur when indi-
viduals are running outside or in a state of 
mental relaxation such as in the shower; 
you are more prone to the flow of ideas in 
this category.  
iv. Finally, Delta waves are classified as hav-
ing the greatest amplitude and slowest fre-
quency between 1.5 and 4 cycles per se-
cond. They will never go completely down 
to zero because that would indicate brain 
death, but deep dreamless sleep will take 
you down to the lowest frequency of ap-
proximately 2 cycles per second [25]. 
 
 
Figure 1: From Ned Herrmann [76] 
 
What is unique about brainwaves is that every 
man, woman, and child of all ages, backgrounds, 
and daily lives experience the same brainwave char-
acteristics. These categories and interactions are 
consistent across geographical lines and cultural 
differences [76].  
 
III.  BRAIN-COMPUTER INTERFACES 
 
This section will discuss Brain-Computer Inter-
face devices before moving on to specific types of 
Brain-Computer Interfaces (I), and the Electroen-
cephalograph (II). 
Brain-Computer Interface (BCI) devices are 
predicted to become heavily used in the future for 
applications in user authentication, neuro-medical 
tools, entertainment and gaming, and smartphones 
[18]. BCIs establish a communication pathway for 
the user to either send information to or control an 
external device exclusively through brain activity 
[23]. This action bypasses the muscle and periph-
eral nervous systems, making it a useful tool for 
people who do not have full function of their bod-
ies. In clinical settings, BCI applications include re-
pairing, augmenting or assisting cognitive func-
tions, and sensory-motor functions in patients with 
physical impairments. Given the significant poten-
tial of BCI devices, particularly the commerciality 
of immediacy and hands-free controls, Yuan et al. 
[80] predicts BCIs will gradually replace device 
control mechanisms, including the keyboard, touch 
screen, and voice command.  
 
I.  TYPES OF BCIS 
 
Brain-Computer Interfaces are divided into 
three types: invasive, partially-invasive, and non-
invasive [17]. 
i. Invasive BCIs require the neural device to 
be implanted directly into the gray mat-
ter—the outer layer of the brain. Invasive 
BCIs could also include the surgical im-
plantation of an electrode array, which con-
nects directly to the central nervous system 
[23]. 
ii. Partially-invasive BCI devices are placed 
inside the skull, but do not touch the gray 
matter. Rather, the device is likely situated 
in one of the dura matter layers.   
iii. Non-invasive BCI devices are attached di-
rectly to the scalp, requiring no surgical ac-
tion. This option is the most common for 
practical authentication devices involving 
brainwaves [23]. 
Various types of signals can be used in a BCI. 
Particularly, neural activity produces magnetic and 
metabolic signals in addition to the more common 
electrical activity captured in an Electroencephalo-
graph (EEG) [44]. Magnetic fields can be recorded 
with a Magnetoencephalography (MEG), and the 
metabolic activity of the brain can be observed 
through a Positron Emission Tomography (PET) 
scan. Other possibilities include the Functional 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) and Optical 
Imaging. Despite the numerous options to gather in-
formation on brain signals, none are as accessible 
for authentication as the EEG, as it requires no so-
phisticated techniques or an exorbitantly expensive 
 3 
device in specialized facilities such as a hospital 
[44].  
 
II.  ELECTROENCEPHALOGRAPH 
 
The small electrical charges created by the ap-
proximately 100 billion neurons in the brain con-
tribute to the generation of an electric field with 
electrical potentials fluctuating around the scalp 
[17]. This electric output can then be read and dis-
sected by an Electroencephalograph machine. An 
EEG records and measures the brain’s electrical ac-
tivity through voltage fluctuations resulting from 
ionic current with the neurons [75] through elec-
trodes placed on the skin [5]. These signals are the 
output that represents brain activity based on a per-
son's unique neural pathway patterns. The unique-
ness of these signals is what makes user-specific 
brainwaves challenging to recreate as they can be 
made distinct from the mood, mental state, and ge-
netic makeup of the user. Such electrophysiological 
traits also naturally allow detecting whether the 
subject is alive at the time of attempted authentica-
tion. This is an additional security measure afforded 
to behavioral biometrics connected to conscious-
ness that static biometrics systems, such as finger-
print and palm print, do not possess [24]. 
EEG-biometry requires modeling or classifying 
of the extracted EEG features from the collected 
signals from the scalp channels. These scalp sig-
nals, however, are not the source signals inside the 
brain. An EEG is the summation of synchronous 
signal activity among thousands of neurons; thus, 
signals read may not have come from the location 
of the node. To obtain a more accurate reading from 
specific sites, spatial filtering can be used during 
the extraction phase [71]. It is more likely that the 
signal is a noisy and linear mixture of the compo-
nents emanating from the brain [24]. This reveals a 
limiting factor for the success of EEG-based bio-
metrics, as a linear mixture matrix can be sensitive 
to where the EEG nodes are precisely placed on the 
scalp.   
EEG signals are generally analyzed in two sep-
arate ways: frequency domain and time domain [4].  
i. Frequency domain focuses on the separa-
tion of oscillatory signals based on differ-
ent bands such as alpha, beta, etc. 
ii. Time domain involves the averaging of the 
signals at the onset of a particular event. 
These signals that are averaged in a syn-
chronized fashion are called Event-Related 
Potentials (ERP). 
 ERPs represent different components of the pro-
cesses of human perception and cognition; they are 
the brain's time-locked response to stimulus [18].  
ERPs are useful because they increase the signal-
to-noise ratio, thus reducing the unrelated brain ac-
tivity shown. Due to the noisiness of readings from 
the brain, finding a measurement that minimizes 
this is crucial for a more transparent reading in au-
thentication. Also, EEGs and ERPs are non-voli-
tional, which states the user cannot willingly con-
trol them, making these metrics difficult to be com-
promised [18].  
 These analyses can be implemented to derive the 
unique brainwave fingerprint of an individual user 
[18]. The advantages afforded by collecting brain-
waves through an EEG is the accessibility and ease 
with which it can acquire the data.  It can capture 
quality temporal resolution and is relatively tolerant 
of subject movement [68]. All of these benefits are 
in addition to being non-invasive through external 
electrode placement. Commercial-grade devices 
are even now readily available making this form of 
authentication both safe and feasible.  
 
IV.  AUTHENTICATION 
 
 This section will contain information on basic 
forms of authentication such as passwords and 
PINs (I). It will then discuss what biometric au-
thentication entails and how matches are made 
(II). Finally, it will cover biometric authentication 
possibilities using brainwaves (III). 
 
I.  BASIC FORMS OF AUTHENTICATION 
 
Means of authentication come in four distinct 
forms commonly described as something you 
know, have, are or do. Something you know or have 
are the most common types of authentication means 
with passwords, PINS, and electronic key cards be-
ing the preferred methods [78]. In password-based 
authentication, the password serves to authenticate 
the ID, which in turn provides security by determin-
ing whether the user is authorized to gain access to 
the system, and what privileges should be given to 
the user. The ID is used in what is called discretion-
ary access control [78]. A considerable amount of 
people use the same password across multiple 
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online login platforms (Figure 2). This indicates 
that although users have the choice to create highly 
complex and varied passwords for any device or 
system, users often choose to re-use passwords 
from other accounts. Given the constrictive pass-
word parameters set by certain sites, users might be 
inclined to create a single complex password that 
will always satisfy the majority of site require-
ments. Remembering this single password across 
online logins can be easier than remembering mul-
tiple complex passwords; thus, the vulnerabilities 
with textual passwords is apparent.   
 
 
Figure 2: From YouGov [79] 
 
Periodically changing passwords is a way to 
counteract the security issues from re-using pass-
words. However, the higher the frequency of forced 
password change, the less likely users are to re-
member them [54]. This leads to users writing 
down passwords or storing them in files to keep up 
with the change, an additional security problem. 
Some vulnerability concerns with passwords 
include an offline dictionary attack, password 
guessing, shoulder surfing, and workstation hijack-
ing. An offline dictionary attack occurs when some-
one gains access to the system password file and 
compares the password hashes against hashes of 
commonly used passwords. If users create pass-
words that are relatively common such as "qwerty", 
"password", or even common words, this attack 
could offer the adversary access. One countermeas-
ure against this would be to include controls that 
prevent the password file from being accessed with-
out authorization through intrusion detection. How-
ever, if those measures failed, the attacker would 
have access to all of the hashed passwords [78]. 
With the example of password guessing against a 
single user, if the attacker has any personal infor-
mation about the user, they could use that to guess 
the password. Training people to choose long and 
difficult passwords acts as a countermeasure 
against this attack, but it still does not offer the 
depth of assurance in the security of the system 
other authentication methods could provide. Fi-
nally, some of the more important vulnerabilities 
for this paper that password authentication possess 
are shoulder surfing and workstation hijacking. 
Shoulder surfing occurs when someone can view 
the user typing in his or her password, thus being 
able to access the system later. As brainwaves are 
not able to be “viewed” by an onlooker, brainwave 
authentication is a method that could be immune to 
this type of attack. Workstation hijacking occurs 
when the attacker waits until a logged-in station is 
unattended and subsequently can use the system af-
ter this vacancy. Although traditional countermeas-
ures for this would be to automatically log-out the 
user after a certain period of inactivity, in the future, 
continuous behavioral biometrics could solve this 
problem.  
 
II.  BIOMETRIC AUTHENTICATION 
 
 Another method for authentication fall under 
the biometric category, with something you are or 
something you do. Biometrics can be further split 
into two factions, static and dynamic. Static biomet-
rics would include fingerprints, iris scanning, and 
facial recognition. Possibly more advanced forms 
of security are dynamic biometrics with voice pat-
tern recognition, typing rhythm, gate analysis, and 
eventually brainwave-based authentication. Finger-
prints can easily be stolen and replicated with stand-
ard imaging and software, making this biometric, 
although the most widely used and accessible at the 
moment, also easily broken. Consumers are far 
more comfortable with static biometric security 
systems, particularly with fingerprint scanning ac-
counting for 53% of consumers (Figure 3). Alt-
hough only approximately 10% of consumers pre-
ferred behavioral biometrics, considering the rela-
tive immaturity of this development, this indicates 
there could be consumer acceptability for behav-
ioral biometrics in the future.  
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Figure 3: From Visa Inc. [74] 
 
Biometric accuracy is imperative to the success 
of a system. Because the data being used is so com-
plex, it would be naïve to expect an exact match 
[78]. Constituting the element of accuracy is the 
False Match Rate (FMR) and False Non-Match 
Rate (FNMR) (Figure 4). The FMR is the fre-
quency with which biometric samples from various 
sources are erroneously assessed to be from the 
same source. An example of this would be if a fin-
gerprint from someone who should not be granted 
access is mistakenly found to be a match, and 
granted access to the system. FNMR describes the 
frequency with which samples from the same 
source are incorrectly assessed to be from different 
sources. Similar to the example above, if finger-
prints from a person with access rights were pre-
sented for authentication, but the system evaluated 
the fingerprints to not be the same as the template, 
this would indicate a False Non-match. 
Figure 4: From William et al. [78] 
 
 
III.  BRAINWAVE AUTHENTICATION 
 
One of the main concerns regarding the validity 
of brainwaves as a practical authentication method 
is whether people have distinct brainwaves, similar 
to how no two fingerprints are the same. This ques-
tion was first addressed in the 1960’s by Vogel F. 
who discovered there was a connection between 
one’s genetic code, DNA, and one’s EEG signals 
[17]. This was tested with monozygotic (identical) 
twins, who were shown to possess the same EEG 
patterns regardless of the situation. This revealed 
that unlike fingerprints, brainwaves are connected 
to the genetic code, and people may have similari-
ties in the way their brains function. Despite the fact 
that brainwaves are not as distinctive among identi-
cal twins, for the majority of the population, brain-
waves are as different as fingerprints, and thus a 
candidate for a new form of authentication. 
For a method of biometric authentication to be 
considered valid and efficient, it must address seven 
predetermined requirements—universality, distinc-
tiveness, permanence, collectability, performance, 
acceptability, and circumvention [17]. 
Universality – Every person required to use the 
system should possess the feature required for au-
thentication. Since every human has a brain and as-
suming they are the one trying to access the system, 
the possession of this living organ provides univer-
sality. 
Distinctiveness – This raises the question whether 
this feature can be unique among all individuals. As 
mentioned in the prior paragraph, brainwaves are 
unique among different people except for similar 
patterns between identical twins. Brainwaves are 
not as 100% distinctive as fingerprints, but the com-
plexity of the brain is undeniable. 
Permanence – The feature of authentication should 
not change significantly over time to meet the re-
quirement of permanence [17]. Because of how hu-
mans process and store memories relating to our ex-
periences, brainwaves will reflect a person’s unique 
psychological state. Brainwave signals are gener-
ated, however, when someone accesses their se-
mantic memories rather than episodic memories 
[25]. Semantic memories do not change drastically 
over time, with neurons likely behaving the same as 
before. Episodic memories remember our experi-
ences; for instance, if you get scratched by a cat, the 
next time you read the word “cat”, the episodic 
memory neurons that fire will likely be different.  
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Semantic memories record the definitions of partic-
ular words [25]. This collection of meanings we ac-
cumulate and associate with words can subtly differ 
from person to person, thus providing an individual 
pattern. Despite the relative stability of brainwaves 
during a stage in someone’s life, our brains do 
change as we experience more, gain knowledge, 
and eventually start to forget. Brainwaves will 
never be as permanent as conventional static meth-
ods of authentication and will require an authenti-
cation system that adapts to the changes that occur 
throughout a lifetime.  
Collectability and Performance – Moving to the 
points of collectability and performance, new 
equipment such as portable and mobile-enabled 
EEG headsets are making the collection of brain-
waves easier than ever. This bodes well for the col-
lectability of this metric while making sure the per-
formance of these models is quick and accurate.   
Acceptability – With any new technology accepta-
bility might be low in the initial stages, but as the 
use of new authentication measures gains traction, 
acceptability could grow.  
Circumvention – Finally, circumvention is per-
haps one of the most important considerations for 
an authentication system. As mentioned above re-
garding the distinctiveness of brainwaves, the brain 
is highly complex, and it would be tough for an im-
poster to mimic someone else's brainwave pattern 
[25].   
Despite the attributes brainwaves might fulfill, 
practical applications of brainwave authentication 
systems are not currently widespread, as the accu-
racy has yet to reach 100% [60] reliably. Although 
there have been a few reports of achieving 100% 
accuracy [38], most research studies fall in the ac-
curacy range of 96-98% [1, 4, 50, 55].  
   
V.  EEG-BASED AUTHENTICATION MODEL 
 
The foundation of an EEG-based authentica-
tion system includes three main phases—data col-
lection, feature extraction, and classification. Data 
collection occurs through the capture of EEG sig-
nals as measured by the electrodes placed on the 
scalp. This will happen while the user is performing 
a specific mental task such as thinking of a word, 
imagining movement, or recognizing an image. 
This data collection is the first step in gathering 
enough information to create a biometric template.  
The next phase is feature extraction, which can 
be difficult with the amount of noise in the readings 
of brainwaves. Some algorithms used to extract sig-
nal features include Power Spectral Density, Fast 
Fourier Transform, and Discrete Wavelet Trans-
form [61]. One authentication problem is extracting 
high-entropy information from the user to find what 
makes a person unique. Certain areas of the brain 
develop more based on training, education, and ex-
perience. An example of this can be found in pro-
fessional musicians; string musicians are known to 
have larger somatosensory cortical areas associated 
with the fingers [15]. It is also known that alpha fre-
quency brainwaves can have considerable variabil-
ity between people [14]. It is this variability that im-
plies how different signals can be emitted from the 
brain even when two people are thinking of the 
same thing. Through the extract, some of this di-
mensionality and variability of signals is lost to get 
the most accurate data. This can create a problem 
for the classification phase. Reduction in data vari-
ability, although it helps with classification, also 
simplifies the features, making it easier for an ad-
versary to manufacture false biometric data to feed 
the system [61]. 
In the classification section, a trained classifier 
outputs a matching score suggesting how closely a 
feature vector resembles a member of a particular 
class; this is likely based on a predetermined thresh-
old [61]. Deep learning techniques are shown to 
provide high classification accuracies and can de-
tect latent features from raw data [70]. Sophisti-
cated deep learning methods such as the convolu-
tional neural networks [32] and recurrent neural 
networks [77] can be implemented to reduce de-
pendency on the feature extraction phase. Deep 
neural networks are comprised of several stacked 
layers of neurons which helps improve the perfor-
mance of the network [32]. Each layer is trained on 
a distinct set of features which depends on the out-
put from the previous layer. Moving further into the 
layers allows for the training on complex features. 
Because deep learning methods can be applied with 
minimal to no feature extraction, desired features 
are automatically learned by the network. This 
makes deep learning suitable for cases when the de-
sired features are unknown, as is the case with the 
complex data emitted by the brain [70]. 
 
I.  PASS-THOUGHTS 
 
One form of brainwave authentication involves 
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the use of pass-thoughts, an authentication method 
by merely thinking of a password, or reacting to a 
stimulus [18]. Pass-thoughts are seen as superior to 
passwords or PINs that must be typed in because 
they are not vulnerable to dictionary attacks or 
shoulder surfing. The potential size of space in a 
pass-thought system seems to be unbounded in the-
ory, as there are no real bounds on human thought; 
however, constraints would have to be placed on 
the system itself [71]. If the assumption is made that 
each neuron in a human brain could store only one 
bit of information, pass-thoughts could produce 
keys of 2"# bits in size. In spite of this math, the 
theoretical entropy is much higher as neurons are so 
complex there has yet to be a complete model of the 
capabilities of individual neuron behavior [71]. 
Brainwave authentication via pass-thoughts is a 
mix of behavioral biometrics and the “what you 
know” section of authentication mechanisms. This 
is because a user would essentially be repeating a 
pre-set password, PIN, or image, which is some-
thing he or she would know, but it would be done 
via an EEG reading, hence the biometric compo-
nent. A potential authentication system using pass-
thoughts was presented by Thorpe et al. [71]. The 
user would begin by pressing a key to indicate they 
are ready to begin the authentication process and 
then think of their previously chosen pass-thought 
before pressing another button indicating they are 
done. Pass-thoughts would undergo feature extrac-
tion; however, there is no need to translate the brain 
signals. Given that this translation is one of the most 
challenging parts of BCI research, pass-thoughts 
could be a simpler beginning model for brainwave 
authentication methods. 
Pass-thought authentication could use a multi-
tude of stimuli including textual and graphical. En-
tire sentences, a picture, or memory could serve as 
a password, eliminating the single word passwords 
most people use. Particularly unique about pass-
thoughts is the opportunities with graphical pass-
words as an alternative to textual passwords, moti-
vated by the remarkable ability of human memory 
for pictures. Many graphical password schemes 
have emerged in research such as Recognition-
based graphical password schemes with Deja Vu 
[13, 51]. Pass-thoughts have been tested in brain-
wave authentication studies in conjunction with 
other metrics to create a multimodal system. These 
systems have been shown to have accuracy of 99% 
[31]. However, authentication with only pass-
thoughts [60] found pass-thoughts alone only of-
fered 8% accuracy.  
 
II.  EVENT-RELATED POTENTIALS 
 
A more promising angle for pass-thought au-
thentication is to focus on P300 signal detection. A 
P300 signal can be registered by a BCI device and 
is an ERP component which can be elicited during 
the process of decision making [16] and appears ap-
proximately 300ms after an exciting or surprising 
event [71] (Figure 5). By randomly highlighting el-
ements on a screen during the authentication pro-
cess, spikes in a P300 signal silently record recog-
nition that could be checked against the template to 
see if it matches. This scheme allows for use of im-
ages, letter sequences, or even musical riffs. This 
would, however, take a slightly longer amount of 
time to complete, as P300 approaches have a bit rate 
of 4.8 characters per minute to have 90% accuracy 
[71]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: From Martinovic et al. [45] 
 
One study conducted by Ruiz-Blondet et al. [60] 
used an ERP biometric protocol called “CERE-
BRE” designed to elicit distinct responses. In this 
research study, it is argued that using ERPs is the 
most effective means for authentication with the 
brain. Because ERPs are created through the aver-
aging over many trips of a particular event, such as 
entering your password, brain activity unrelated to 
the event in question is reduced. This allows the ex-
perimenter to control the cognitive state of the user 
being reflected in the ERP activity. The CEREBRE 
protocol was designed for this study to test the hy-
pothesis that controlling the cognitive state of users 
through specific stimulations could achieve a 
higher biometric accuracy [60].  
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A.  CEREBRE PROTOCOL 
 
 The biometric classification was based on ERP 
responses to 5 categories of stimulus that should 
elicit distinct patterns of activation across individu-
als. Results were compared to biometric accuracy 
data from a standard eyes-closed EEG acquisition 
protocol [71] and a pass-thought protocol [10]. The 
categories of stimulation to evoke ERPs included: 
Sine gratings – these were selected as they are 
known to strongly stimulate the primary visual cor-
tex [9] which varies in its topographical pattern of 
folds from person to person [8], thus eliciting robust 
visual potentials over the back of the head [57]. 
Low-frequency words – these were selected be-
cause ERP response to words individuals know the 
meaning of differs from the response to words indi-
viduals do not know. This evidence further indi-
cates that individuals exhibit substantial variation in 
their knowledge of low-frequency words [39]. 
Word frequency effect on an ERP is well-character-
ized as greater negativity for low than high-fre-
quency words beginning around 250ms post-stimu-
lus onset over the back of the head [40, 59]. Indi-
viduals response to word-forms was the basis of 
Ruiz-Blondet et al. [60] previous work with biomet-
rics, which achieved 97% identification accuracy 
[4]. These words were chosen from the GRE low-
frequency word lists and were less than ten letters 
long. 
Images of foods – these images were selected 
based on the notion that food preference is highly 
individual. This is accompanied by how the struc-
tures in the ventral midbrain exhibit activation pro-
files, which respond to images of food, vary propor-
tionally to individuals’ preferences for those foods 
[49]. Other examples of ERP responses to food 
stimuli can be found in [65, 67]. Images were gath-
ered through a pre-experiment study with 44 other 
people asked to list ten foods they love and ten 
foods they hate. The most common foods from 
these lists were chosen.   
Celebrity faces – this stimulus was selected based 
on the observation that celebrities can be polariz-
ing; some celebrities are loved, and others are 
hated. Structures in the orbitofrontal cortex exhibit 
activation profiles in response to images of faces 
that vary proportionally to an individual’s judgment 
of those faces attractiveness [30, 60]. The same pre-
experiment study done with food images was con-
ducted with celebrities for selection. 
Oddball stimuli – a P300 signal can be detected 
when someone responds to a rare target stimulus 
embedded in a sequence of common stimuli. The 
morphology of the P300 is known to exhibit indi-
vidual variation. The P300 has been a common ba-
sis for the limited work that has been done with 
ERP biometrics in the past [20]. In this study, odd-
ball stimuli consisted of images from the other four 
categories, presented in color instead of black and 
white.  
 
B.  METHODS 
 
The study initially consisted of 56 participants 
with an age range of 18-43 years old, 20.2 years was 
the mean age. After either failure to follow instruc-
tions or equipment malfunction, 50 participants re-
mained for the final database; this is much larger 
than the reported mean (29 people across ten studies 
[2]) of participant numbers in other brain biometric 
studies. No particular screening was used, allowing 
the study to be as universal as possible [60]. 
Before the experiment began, participants were 
asked to select a “pass-thought”, after which they 
were told to think of that “pass-thought” when 
shown a black key icon during the study. Also, be-
fore the experiment, a demonstration on how arti-
facts like eye-movement during data collection 
could impact brainwaves was conducted. Research 
done by Luck [43] has shown how this type of 
demonstration before a study can improve signal 
quality. 
 
C.  EXPERIMENT 
 
Participants were exposed to 400 images (100 
sine, 100 words, 100 food pictures, 100 face pic-
tures, with 300/400 of images in black and white). 
These 400 images were presented in random order 
broken into blocks of 100 images. At the beginning 
and end of each block, participants were prompted 
to give their pass-thought for roughly three seconds 
[60]. After the 400 images were shown, 90 ran-
domly selected color food images were presented. 
One example was the use of a color picture of a 
hamburger. Participants were asked to respond 
when they saw that particular hamburger. Finally, 
towards the end of the experiment, participants 
were asked to relax by closing their eyes for five 
minutes. They were not to fall asleep, so this could 
be used to acquire resting-state EEG readings. In 
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total, the experiment took approximately 1.5 hours. 
This included the 30 minutes for EEG electrode 
placement of 26 active Ag/AgCI electrodes on the 
scalp, and placement of three electrooculogram 
(EOG) sensors on the face and one on the right mas-
toid [60]. 
ERPs at each electrode were created for every 
stimulus and included 550 samples, 50 pre-stimuli, 
and 500 post stimuli. This resulted in a 1100ms 
ERP. Contrary to what is usually found in ERP lit-
erature, ERPs in this study were then filtered with a 
band-pass of 1-55 Hz for the classification stage ra-
ther than below 20 Hz [39, 40, 41]. The value of 
classifying at a lower frequency is the ability to re-
duce the impact of muscle activity on the readings. 
However, this study chose to include higher fre-
quency to leave the cognitive gamma band intact 
[48].   
Classification involved a simple discriminant 
function based on normalized cross-correlation 
[60]. Each participant's response to the stimulus 
were split into two random halves: a challenge half 
and a reference half. For the 90 responses to colored 
food, 45 responses were randomly selected and av-
eraged into a reference ERP, and the other 45 were 
averaged into a challenge ERP. The data from the 
middle occipital channel was most useful as occip-
ital electrodes capture human primary visual cortex 
activity [58]. As this study involved visual stimula-
tion, data from this channel was most pertinent. The 
goal of the classifier was to identify, via cross-cor-
relation, which reference ERP was most similar 
given a challenge ERP. Each participant’s chal-
lenge ERP was cross-correlated with their own ref-
erence ERP and with the reference ERPs of the 
other 49 participants.  
D.  RESULTS 
All stimuli, other than resting state, achieved a 
higher than chance identification accuracy (Figure 
6). Also shown is the "field-leading 100% accu-
racy" from La Rocca et al. [38]. One reason this 
EEG classifier could have performed poorly here is 
that no feature extraction was undertaken. This 
choice was made to have a more direct comparison 
between the analytic techniques applied to the EEG 
and ERP. Also, the five primary stimuli were each 
given 30 trials in both challenge and reference 
ERPs, while the hamburger and pass-thought clas-
sifiers only included five trials. Because of this dis-
crepancy, it is not valid to make direct comparisons 
between these accuracy results. The best results 
came from the combination of all six stimuli using 
data from all 30 nodes. Although this could achieve 
100% accuracy, it is a much more in-depth and 
time-consuming process. Results indicate that all 
single stimulus, single-channel ERP classifiers 
were more accurate than pass-thoughts. When mul-
tiple channels and stimuli were allowed, accuracy 
was able to reach 100% which supports the general 
hypothesis that ERPs might provide accurate bio-
metric results. One reason ERP biometrics could be 
especially useful is in its ability to connect to func-
tionally distinct brain networks, providing identify-
ing information about a user. By combining a mul-
titude of stimuli with a large number of nodes, using 
the brains ERPs as a biometric has been proven not 
only possible but capable of high levels of accuracy 
[60].  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: From Ruiz-Blondet et al. [60] 
VI.  CONTINUOUS AUTHENTICATION 
 
What is uncommon about brainwaves is the 
possibility of continuous authentication as a new 
behavioral biometric. Conventional authentication 
methods that most industries use are static. This 
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would include passwords, PINs, fingerprint, and 
iris scanning. Although these methods may have an 
advantage of being quick and easy to implement, 
they cannot offer a secure and continuous connec-
tion to a system. They do not require users to con-
stantly re-authenticate themselves for continued ac-
cess. This means systems implementing these secu-
rity protocols are vulnerable to an attack if someone 
were to take control of the device once it had been 
unlocked. One-time authentication may be appro-
priate for systems where the security requirement is 
low such as the average person’s phone; there could 
be valuable and personal information on the device, 
but nowhere near the more valuable data that could 
be found on a government system. It is likely the 
place more intense security measures would be re-
quired, would be the first to push for adoption of 
more resilient measures.  
The basis of continuous authentication, affirm-
ing human identity in real-time, relies on repeated 
user verification on a loop throughout the session. 
The system must be able to decide “certainty” at 
any point in time [3]. Authenticating the user once 
at the initial log-in stage and once during the ses-
sion is not enough to assure the user's presence and 
identity. The advantage of behavioral biometric se-
curity is both a safety and convenience factor. Be-
cause these attributes are inherent to the individual, 
they are more natural sources of data. Natural hu-
man data sources are the most promising for passive 
continuous authentication, a method that wouldn't 
cause authentication to interfere with the user's reg-
ular usage. Brainwave metrics could be read on a 
continuous basis without requiring the user to take 
additional action to authenticate, a substantial ad-
vantage no other system has yet to offer. 
One research study that looks into continuous 
authentication was conducted by Kumar et al. [33]. 
This work investigated the usefulness of four One-
Class Classifiers OCC (elliptic envelope, isolation 
forest, local outliers factor, and one-class support 
vector machines) and their fusion. The implemen-
tation of a continuous system generally involves 
use of a sliding window [34, 35, 36]. Authentication 
decisions are given based on either patterns cap-
tured in the current window, or patterns captured in 
the last few windows. Kumar et al. [33] applied this 
specifically looking at gait biometrics and phone 
movement patterns. The findings suggested that it 
is possible to build a behavior-based biometric con-
tinuous authentication system by implementing 
OCC and their fusion, though no accuracy results 
were shared [33].  
At this stage in brainwave biometrics, no stud-
ies have been found that specifically test the valid-
ity of continually authenticating via brainwaves. 
However, research by Maruoka et al. [46] evaluated 
the possibility of using evoked potentials from au-
ditory stimulation.  The use of auditory stimuli does 
not disturb the user as do formally presented stimuli 
for other ERP studies [60]. The five participants in 
this study wore a brainwave sensor by Emotive 
Cop., were placed in a silent room, and asked to 
close their eyes and not move their bodies during 
the experiment. This environment was very con-
trolled, thus attempting to eliminate artifacts.  
The stimulus presented was controlled by mu-
sic-player software and brainwave measurement 
was controlled by software produced by Emotive 
Cop. Results from this study showed that evoked 
potentials from supersonic sounds lead to an in-
crease of the spectrum in the Alpha band at the elec-
trodes on the back of the head [46]. It has also been 
discovered that the spectrum in the Beta band in-
creased when sounds of favorite tempos are pre-
sented [6], which offers the notion that auditory 
stimulation can provide useful potentials. Thus, 
there is indication that both audible and inaudible 
sounds could be a metric continuously presented to 
a user for verification [46].  
 
VII.  ETHICS 
 
More so now than at any point in history is the 
connectivity and integration of “man and machine” 
so prevalent in new technology. People store highly 
personal details on their computers, open phones 
with the touch of a finger, and rely on implanted 
biomedical devices to keep them alive. What some 
refer to as the “connective turn” has created a new 
mass public where frequent access to machines is 
required [26, 27]. It is here that the basics of per-
sonal identity and privacy become tangled with the 
expansion of technology and the need to interact, 
retrieve, and contribute digital content. The social, 
biological, and technological spheres of society 
come together in the implementation of biometrics, 
as human attributes can be reduced to sets of data 
some argue is a "naïve over-simplification of the 
uniqueness that characterizes humanity" [54]. Mil-
lions of fingerprints have been collected in the 
United States, Europe, and elsewhere over the years 
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for use in forensic identification [73]. These bio-
metric measurements have been digitized to form 
growing interconnected databases that allow quick 
online searches for the identification of someone. 
Databases containing this personal information are 
increasingly interoperating, allowing the sharing of 
this data among different organizations and across 
countries [64]. Although this accessibility may 
have the advantage of convenience, there are ethical 
concerns associated with the storage and subse-
quent use of personal and identifiable biometric 
data. In this regard, certain aspects of the human 
body are being transformed into a digital represen-
tation for consumption by multiple organizations 
and people. Some would argue that the continued 
overlap between biology and technology has rede-
fined the human body in terms of information [73]. 
The points on someone's fingertips are numbers put 
into a government database for possible authentica-
tion later, ECG measurements are shown in a med-
ical file, and even DNA samples are available at fer-
tility clinics. Vital biological information is being 
shared among the government and corporations in 
a way not too different than mathematical or finan-
cial information is shared.  
Often, the integration of the body with security 
measures involves only superficial contact such as 
a fingerprint or hand to a scanner. Everything be-
yond the touching and procurement of the metric to 
create a digital representation—biometric tem-
plates, medical scans, digital images—can be seen 
as sensitive, personal information [73]. What must 
be decided is whether the body part itself is only 
subject to protection, or if the information retrieved 
from the body should also be given the same pri-
vacy rights. It is in this integration of biology and 
technology that the body itself and information 
from the body must be distinguished as biometrics 
further evolve.  
The concept of ethics is influenced by law, pol-
icy, and cultural norms [64]. It involves balancing 
competing interests such as advancement of re-
search efforts versus national security concerns. 
One could ask if it is ethical to collect the DNA of 
every United States citizen if it is to gather more 
information to thwart a terrorist attack. Does the no-
tion of "greater good" outweigh physical intrusions 
from DNA and other biometric readings? Siew et 
al. [64] discuss five main ethical principles con-
cerning behavioral biometrics: 
Privacy – Regarding biometric information, it pro-
tects the right for information to not be collected or 
distributed without informed consent. This can be a 
challenge when data is frequently shared with third 
party institutions for evaluation. However, bio-
metric technologies are evolving to the point where 
interoperability standards could pose ethical dilem-
mas. 
Confidentiality – The sharing of information is of-
ten of benefit in the scientific community, however, 
potential threats to the confidentiality of data being 
distributed online is a problem for sensitive biomet-
rics. It has been argued that it is impossible to 
achieve absolute confidentiality and constant ac-
cess to patient information [56]. This could be an 
issue if a person's biometric data is meant to be 
stored and assessed across multiple platforms. 
Security – Data and system security are two of the 
main types. Data security relates to the protection 
of data from accidental or intentional disclosure to 
unauthorized persons, while system security pro-
tects the confidential information thereby protect-
ing the privacy of the individuals who are the sub-
jects of stored information [64]. 
Property and Ownership – This principle is per-
haps the hardest to differentiate when it comes to 
biometric data. Some would argue that patient med-
ical files or biometric data belongs to the person 
who collects, compiles, and holds it such as a med-
ical practitioner or software company. Others 
would say the patients or users are the rightful own-
ers of that information, as they have the access 
rights because that information came from their 
body. Regarding biometric data, this raises the 
question whether the user owns the data used for 
biometric authentication, or if ownership falls to the 
person who possesses the biometric [29]. 
Reliability and Trustworthiness – At the core of 
biometric applications should be the notion of trust 
that error and harm will be minimized. Reliability 
is not guaranteed with biometrics as matching is 
based on probability. As such, it is possible that cer-
tain people will have a more favorable experience 
using biometrics, and this could render the system 
more trustworthy for some over others. Standardi-
zation of biometric requirements helps with trust-
worthiness; if the public is more accepting of the 
system, the trust will increase.   
Deliberate misuse most commonly occurs in 
the context of criminal activity where the infor-
mation is obtained to be sold or used for theft such 
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as with identity. Unintentional data leakage is diffi-
cult to address, although it violates ethical princi-
ples. One example was when medical data from 100 
patients was mistakenly emailed to recipients who 
should not have had that information [69]. This act 
was unintentional, yet still caused harm. Finally, 
business practices can lead to the misuse of data if 
the data is not stored and erased properly. Data 
could also be shared across business units under the 
same corporation [64]. The more sensitive bio-
metric data is shared, the more likely it is to end up 
released or suffer misuse. 
 
VIII.  ONGOING CHALLENGES 
 
As the feasibility of brainwave authentication 
continues to grow, ongoing challenges with the de-
velopment should be addressed. This section will 
discuss issues of security (I), impersonation at-
tacks (II), discrimination and failures with biomet-
rics (III), and the leakage of sensitive information 
that could happen with brainwave authentication 
(IV). 
 
I.  NEUROSECURITY 
 
Security concerns are particularly significant 
with technology that has access to sensitive per-
sonal information such as with medical devices. 
The caveat of neural devices is that a communica-
tion pathway must be established to the nervous 
system in order allow computer systems access and 
the ability to process neural computation [28]. It is 
this accessibility that is both paramount for effec-
tive use of the device, and also the feature that of-
fers the biggest area for security risks, specifically 
concerning privacy. As neural computation in-
volves the behavior and cognition of a person, eth-
ical safeguards taking into account the possible 
physiological and psychological harm that could 
occur should be considered early in product design 
[23]. 
One example of this emerging risk can be found 
by Halperin et al. [22]. An experiment was con-
ducted which demonstrated a hacker could wire-
lessly compromise the privacy and security of a 
commercial cardiac defibrillator implant [23]. This 
intrusive act was achieved through surprisingly 
simple measures with homemade and low-cost 
equipment. The outcome of this hack was the abil-
ity to change or disable the patient’s therapies, and 
induce potentially fatal processes. This is proof that 
security of bioengineering devices is not only about 
keeping private information secure, but also about 
preventing potentially cataclysmic and fatal events. 
Some specific security concerns with brain-
wave authentication include attacking the authenti-
cation system via synthetic EEG signals. The adver-
sary could build an EEG model based on historical 
EEG data from a user [42]. However, due to the 
complexity of the brain, this threat could be 
thwarted by building a more robust authentication 
system leveraging a multimodal approach. Risks 
associated with BCI devices, such as those used for 
collecting EEGs, are largely unexplored. BCIs are 
potentially vulnerable to cyber criminality in a new 
area known as "neurocrime". This involves the ex-
tension of what constitutes a computer-crime to in-
clude technologies with a connection to the brain 
such as neural devices [23]. 
A specific type of neurocrime referred to as 
“brain-hacking” aims to gain access to and manip-
ulate neural information and computation [23]. 
Within this field, there are more requirements, as it 
can only be performed through a connection with 
the brain such as with neural implants or BCIs, and 
leads to the direct access, manipulation, and influ-
ence of neural computation. This could be done 
through the use of an EEG device. With the brain 
acting as a vital organ maintaining life processes as 
well as faculties, misuse of neural devices for crim-
inal purposes not only threatens physical security 
and possibly access to systems, it could also influ-
ence the user's behavior and later their self-identifi-
cation as a person [23]. Neurocrime, however, does 
not necessarily require direct access to the brain and 
brain information. Neurocriminal activities most 
likely impact the brain indirectly. 
Brain-hacking can be executed at multiple 
stages of authentication or use of a neural device. 
The main four junctions where this could occur are 
input manipulation at the start, measurement, de-
coding and classification, and feedback [23]. Be-
ginning with input manipulation, this occurs when 
the hacker attacks the user at the moment when in-
put to the system is being provided. An alteration of 
the stimuli presented to the user could offer an ad-
vantage to the hacker by preselecting target stimu-
lants to elicit a specific response. One study to test 
the feasibility of this attack was Martinovic et al. 
[45].  Given six separate classes of stimuli—PIN 
code digits, bank related photos, month names, 
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debit card digits, locations, and faces—one target 
stimulus for each class was placed in a randomly 
permuted sequence of non-target stimuli. An exam-
ple of this would be during the "bank experiment" 
when a picture of an ATM from the user's bank was 
the target stimulus. Pictures of ATMs from other 
banks would serve as the non-target stimuli. Detec-
tion of a P300 signal in response to private infor-
mation, such as recognition of a user's particular 
ATM, could be used to indicate personal infor-
mation. These results show that input-manipulation 
could be used to attack the private information of a 
user.   
Regarding measurement manipulation, brain-
hacking could occur to generate output different 
than those expected through regular processing 
[23]. Some reasons an attack may happen in this 
manner could be to crack the BCI’s raw data, dis-
rupt BCI functionality, or hijack the device itself. 
As explained by Conner [11], a hacker named Cody 
Brocious was able to crack the encryption on the 
EPOC Emotiv BCI, allowing someone to read en-
crypted data directly from the headset. Despite this 
intrusion potential, it only allows the pulling of raw 
data from the device, how the signals and sensors 
correspond to each stream of data must still be de-
duced. Attacks during this measurement stage could 
allow the hacker to alter the measuring process, per-
haps adding noise, opening the door to sabotage or 
delay of BCI application functionality.  
Similar to the phase above, brain-hacking at the 
decoding and classification level is also aimed at 
creating outputs different than those intended by the 
user. As discussed by Haselager et al. [23], an ad-
versary could achieve this by adding noise or alter-
ing the machine learning component used for clas-
sification. A noise-adding hack has the advantage of 
being relatively easy to perform and less likely to 
be detected. This could bode well for an attacker 
who hopes to remain unnoticed. In contrast, if an 
adversary wishes to gain more control over a BCI 
device or application, overriding the signal sent to 
the output device could prove a more dangerous 
method. A successful hijacking attempt could in-
volve the system being given different commands 
than those intended, resulting in control over the 
BCI application [23]. One use for this attack could 
include the blocking of an authentication attempt by 
a user. The inability to gain access to a device could 
be just as serious as the inability to control it.  
Finally, feedback manipulation is another stage 
in which brain-hacking could happen. At the end of 
each cycle, feedback is perceived by the user. A 
hack in this phase would revolve around the altera-
tion of user perceptions. The goal of an attack 
would be to induce a particular cognitive state or 
action, which the user did not authorize. This could 
result in criminal activities such as fraud, identity 
theft, and physical or psychological harm [23]. 
One common threat model surrounds a spoof-
ing attack; an adversary could use some manufac-
tured biometric data to gain access [62]. In the 
threat model by Sadeghi et al. [62], there are three 
components to an attack: adversary's knowledge, 
adversary's capability, and the adversary's goal. 
i. Knowledge – One example would be a 
grey-box attack where it is assumed an ad-
versary has access to some biometric sam-
ples with the subject’s data. In this sce-
nario, it is also given that the feature type 
and extractor are known, such as brain-
waves, but the classifier is unknown. 
ii. Capability – The main capability of an ad-
versary would be to present raw input data 
into the system. In the case of brainwaves, 
the adversary would have to deduce a sin-
gle feature and convert that into raw EEG 
signals. In this sense, a brute-force attack 
would likely take place as it would require 
guessing all possible combinations until a 
positive response was received from the 
system. Because brainwaves are unique 
and highly complex based on the stimuli, 
this task would be difficult, and perhaps the 
adversary's greatest hurdle to intrusion. 
iii. Goal – The objective is to obtain a viable 
signal such that it can be correctly classi-
fied in the target subject’s class, resulting in 
authentication. Within this category, the ad-
versary has two choices in how to pursue—
replay attack and manufacturing data. A re-
play attack involves reusing snooped data, 
which can be blocked by applying a simi-
larity check between historical signal data 
and new data. This ensures that the data is 
not the same as the stored data, implying it 
was stolen and indicating a possible threat. 
Manufacturing input data would require in-
formation regarding the feature extraction 
algorithm in addition to the range and di-
mensions of data features. The adversary 
could begin by guessing feature vectors and 
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regenerating raw input through reverse fea-
ture extraction algorithms [62].  
At the current level of sophistication and prev-
alence of brain-hacking, the benefits of BCI devel-
opment are far greater than the risks that could man-
ifest relating to neurocrime and brain-hacking. 
Mild-forms of brain-hacking have been proven fea-
sible in laboratory settings, but no real-world exam-
ples have appeared at the severity discussed in re-
search. The level of accuracy and speed at which 
someone would have to decode brain signals is far 
from what can be done currently with computer 
code. 
 
II.  IMPERSONATION ATTACKS 
 
As mentioned in the prior paragraph, a major 
security concern with any authentication system is 
the likelihood that someone could impersonate a 
user to gain access. With traditional biometrics such 
as fingerprints, this is relatively easy to achieve 
with the right image and data on the subject. How-
ever, this becomes considerably harder when the 
data used for authentication resides in the con-
sciousness of the user. A study completed by John-
son et al. [31] tests whether brainwaves are vulner-
able to impersonation during authentication.  
This research was an extension of prior work 
conducted by Chuang et al. [10] in which brain-
waves were used to create an authentication system 
with 99% accuracy. The original study involved 15 
subjects performing seven mental tasks, during 
which brainwave signals were collected ten times 
per subject per task. The seven mental tasks used in 
the original study were also used to test for impost-
ers in this study. Below are the descriptions and in-
structions for each mental task completed by the 
subjects as described by Johnson et al. [31]. 
i. Breathing – “Close your eyes and focus 
on your breathing for 10 seconds.” 
ii. Simulated Finger Movement – “Imag-
ine in your mind that you are moving 
your right index finger up and down in 
sync with your breathing, without actu-
ally moving your finger, for 10 se-
conds.” 
iii. Sports – “Select a specific repetitive 
motion from a sport of your choosing. 
Imagine moving your body muscles to 
perform this motion, for 10 seconds.” 
iv. Song/Passage Recitation – “Imagine 
that you are singing a song or reciting 
a passage for 10 seconds without mak-
ing any noise.” 
v. Eye and Audio Tone – “Close your 
eyes and listen for an audio tone. After 
5 seconds, the tone will play; upon 
hearing the tone, open your eyes and 
stare at the dot on the piece of paper in 
front of you for an additional 5 se-
conds.” 
vi. Object Counting – “Choose one of four 
colors – red, green, blue, or yellow. 
You will be shown on a computer 
screen a sequence of six images. Each 
image contains a 5x6 grid of colored 
boxes. As each grid appears, count, si-
lently in your mind, the number of 
boxes corresponding to your chosen 
color. A new grid will appear after each 
5 seconds. This will continue six 
rounds for a total of 30 seconds." 
vii. Pass-thought – “Choose your own 
pass-thought. A pass-thought is like a 
password; however, instead of choos-
ing a sequence of letters and numbers, 
one chooses a mental thought. When 
instructed to begin, focus on your pass-
thought for 10 seconds.” 
One question addressed in this research was 
whether knowledge of a subject’s chosen task im-
pacts the success of an impersonation attack [31]. 
The acceptance rate for imposters was approxi-
mately 4.5% with four of the subjects’ experiences 
false acceptance rates less than 1.2%. One of the 
most difficult tasks to impersonate was the “song 
task”, where the original subject had selected the 
“Serbian National Anthem” [31]. The imposters 
themselves had extreme difficulty impersonating 
this thought on their own, due to the language bar-
rier and unfamiliarity.  It was discovered that, in 
general, the imposter authentication success rate is 
low. Knowing the subject's task, or task secret, only 
provided a small improvement over thinking about 
another topic entirely. This shows, that even if an 
attacker knows what to think about during authen-
tication to impersonate a user, it is unlikely the 
brainwave signals will match enough to offer au-
thentication.    
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III.  DISCRIMINATION AND FAILURES 
 
In the United States, as of July 1st, 2014, the 
number of people who were 65 and older was ap-
proximately 46.2 million which accounts for 14.5% 
of the total population [72]. It is also estimated that 
by 2060 that number will be nearly one in four US 
residents at around 98.2 million people [72]. This 
increase in older adults brings about the question of 
inclusion as biometric technologies proliferate the 
industry. The common notion is that new technol-
ogy is only for the younger generation, as it is them 
who tend to adopt products earlier and integrate 
them into their lives faster. Older adults, particu-
larly those reaching ages over 65 in the 2010s, are 
facing the rapid integration of technology. Where 
banks used to be only in brick-and-mortar stores, 
now operate through web portals or phone apps. 
Although these products are made readily available 
to all sectors of the population, it is often that older 
adults are excluded from the mass adoptability that 
benefits most technology. As biometric authentica-
tion systems become more prolific, and as they are 
integrated into a wider range of activities such as 
banking, benefits, and goods purchasing, it is essen-
tial biometrics are both convenient and reliable for 
all people. If biometrics fail to identify older people 
efficiently, the problematic minority concerning 
technology adopters will rapidly become the major-
ity, and new forms of biometric authentication such 
as brainwaves will fail as a widespread tool [53]. 
Unlike passwords and PINs, where the alphabet 
and numbers will never change, no biometric fea-
ture is fully permanent over time. Almost all fea-
tures show significant deterioration as people age, 
and those that are most permanent such as DNA are 
difficult to collect. A consequence of this relative 
instability is the deterioration of quality in each 
metric, particularly with older adults who could be 
prone to failure-to-enroll biases in biometric sys-
tems [53]. One example can be found in the Unique 
ID program in India, which aimed to provide a na-
tional biometric system that could identify the 
members of its 1.1 billion inhabitants. Ultimately, 
it had difficulty enrolling those above the age of 65 
[53]. Three modalities were proposed—face, fin-
gerprint, and iris—and problems with each modal-
ity emerged pertaining to deterioration with age.  
i. Faces show clear change over time as the 
collagen in the body decreases leading to 
wrinkling, sagging, skin elasticity, and 
changes in skull and jaw dimensions. 
ii. The quality of fingerprint ridge structures 
lessens with age as the physical definition 
is lost. Lower collagen levels create sub-
optimal contact with the sensor which can 
lead to an unclear reading of the finger-
print. 
iii. It used to be believed that the iris was an 
extremely permanent feature as it is an in-
ternal organ of the eye [12]. This has 
changed, however, as conditions such as 
cataracts and glaucoma could alter iris ap-
pearance [37]. 
Where authentication systems falter is in the 
time between when the original template is created 
and when someone attempts to be identified later. 
If there has been a significant amount of time be-
tween the generation of the two templates, an indi-
vidual’s biometric feature could have changed 
enough that the score fails to meet the system’s 
threshold [53]. This is known as template aging, 
and it does not only concern older adults in isola-
tion. Template aging can impact anyone for whom 
there has been a significant amount of time since 
their enrollment in a system. This time-lapse, alt-
hough problematic for anyone, can be particularly 
detrimental for the older population as significant 
alterations in features are more likely to occur later 
in life. This is mostly due to the natural aging pro-
cess and higher likelihood medical conditions could 
play a role [53]. Some recommended solutions to 
template aging could include template updates and 
exploiting age-invariant features. With the first ex-
ample, this would involve updating templates and 
re-enrolling individuals, an extensive and costly en-
deavor. On the other hand, trying to find biometric 
features that are immutable is an equally difficult 
task. Some parts of the face do change less over 
time, but all parts of the body experience change 
over a lifetime and thus weaken the usability of 
static biometrics [53]. As suggested, a way to com-
bat this inevitable physical change could be to focus 
on more intuitive behavioral metrics such as brain-
waves. Although the brain does evolve, the way 
people inherently process information is relatively 
stagnant. As mentioned in section VI on continuous 
authentication, the brain is uniquely positioned to 
act as an ever flowing and evolving authentication 
metric. Significant advances in machine learning 
and artificial intelligence could create the possibil-
ity of a template that evolves as the user does. As 
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the brain experiences more, a better fitting model of 
how an individual’s brainwaves present can be cre-
ated. Through repeated use with brainwave authen-
tication, templates could grow to fit the user, elim-
inating the need to handle metrics that become out-
dated.  
 
IV.  SENSITIVE INFORMATION REVEALED 
 
Another ethical and security dilemma to con-
sider is whether the use of a brainwave authentica-
tion reveals highly personal and sensitive infor-
mation about the user. The main goal of designing 
an authentication system is to maximize the accu-
racy. This does not raise many problems when us-
ing conventional methods, or even with most static 
biometric measures. It is true that fingerprints re-
veal biological information about the user; how-
ever, it does not reveal sensitive personal infor-
mation as behavioral biometrics do. Having the fin-
gerprint of an individual doesn't divulge medical 
conditions or behavioral tendencies. This is not the 
case with brainwaves since brainwaves encode a 
multitude of other potentially sensitive information 
about the user. Multiple variables are used creating 
an authentication device including the features to 
build user templates, signal frequency ranges for 
extraction, and the location on the scalp for elec-
trode placement. As suggested by Matovu et al. 
[47], a “single-pronged, privacy-agnostic ap-
proach” focused only on accuracy could have se-
vere privacy implications. In the majority of studies 
done on brainwave authentication, researcher’s pri-
mary agenda is to lower system error rates. Certain 
design attributes in the authentication system might 
be more prone to potential leakage of personal in-
formation. If a system with the lowest authentica-
tion error rates also divulges significantly higher 
amounts of personal data, it begs the question 
whether the trade-off is practical and ethical. The 
research conducted by Matovu et al. [47] hypothe-
sizes, with the assumption that all system variables 
have been optimized for authentication accuracy, 
whether a malicious entity could exploit the bio-
metric templates to infer non-authentication-centric 
information regarding the user. Other questions 
considered include if inferences are possible, 
whether particular template designs would be more 
vulnerable than others and if a more robust collec-
tion of sensitive information could be gleaned—
emotions, medical conditions, and learning abili-
ties.  
Matovu et al. [47] looks specifically at the be-
havior of substance abuse, the condition of being an 
alcoholic. The revelation of such information could 
have not only cyber security implications but legal 
ones as well. The threat model used in this study 
was based on the assumption that an attacker would 
have access to a database of EEG authentication 
templates, thus eliminating the initial question of 
determining what metric and templates are used. In 
this case, the attacker must have had inside 
knowledge about the template formulation to ex-
ploit the system fully. Because this study is evalu-
ating the personal information about a subject, it is 
not as concerned with the manner in which an ad-
versary acquires the tools to exploit the system. The 
dataset used was collected by Neurodynamics La-
boratory, SUNY Downstate Medical Center, of 
which 50 subjects were chosen—25 from each of 
the alcoholic and control groups. All subjects were 
detoxed 30 days prior to data collection, and each 
provided 30 samples for the study. Two templates 
were created specifying different electrode place-
ment of the scalp. 
i. Template 1 – Six electrodes were placed on 
the scalp with each electrode giving a total 
of six features. After computing the spec-
tral density from the signals of each elec-
trode, only the data from alpha and beta 
ranges was retained, where three features 
were computed: entropy, mean, and stand-
ard deviation. 
ii. Template 2 – This template only used one 
electrode, the Front Polar, placed near the 
frontal lobe. Again, only data from alpha 
and beta ranges was retained once the 
power spectral density was computed for 
the electrode. 
 These two templates gave mean Half Total 
Error Rate (HTER) of between 0.155 and 0.264 
with HTER calculated as 𝐻𝑇𝐸𝑅 = 	 *+,-*.+,/  
[44]. Although these error rates are far outside those 
for a system ready for deployment, they are not too 
far from those previously reported in the literature 
[10, 44].  
Through the use of a mutual information met-
ric, the dependency between a user's template and 
alcohol use behavior can be understood. Mutual in-
formation can detect non-linear relationships, thus 
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enabling the researcher to get a rigorous account of 
how an EEG biometric template could reveal infor-
mation about a user's behavior regarding alcohol 
abuse. In this study, mutual information between 
the biometric class labels and biometric features, 
and the mutual information between the same bio-
metric features and the alcohol use class labels (if a 
user is alcoholic or not) were analyzed.  
From the first angle, the evaluation gives in-
sights into the intensity in which the features reduce 
uncertainty about the user’s identity—referred to as 
the M Iauth setting. The second approach gives in-
formation about how strongly the features reduce 
uncertainty about the user’s alcohol usage behav-
ior—referred to as the MIalco setting. In the context 
of building an accurate and private authentication 
system, the goal would be to have high amounts of 
mutual information from the M Iauth setting, while 
also maintaining less mutual information from the 
MIalco setting. If the MIalco setting exhibits higher 
mutual information, thus a stronger dependency, 
then it is probable the system’s high authentication 
accuracy comes at the cost of the leakage of user 
personal information [47]. The conclusion reached 
by the researchers conducting this study [47] found 
that for almost 25% of the population in the study, 
the authentication template divulged a significantly 
higher amount of information about their alcohol 
use behavior than it did for the primary authentica-
tion goal.  
Alcoholism is just one behavioral element that 
could be inferred from brainwave analysis. By mak-
ing variable changes in the locations of EEG elec-
trodes and feature extraction, it is possible that 
other behaviors could be gleaned. However, it was 
also found that in changing some of the above-men-
tioned variables, the security of a template could be 
increased while only causing a slight reduction in 
the mean authenticity accuracy. This proves that it 
might be possible to find an optimal solution of 
electrode placement and feature extraction that 
minimizes information leakage while maintaining a 
reliable level of authentication accuracy. Despite 
that fact that some personal information can be 
gleaned through brainwave authentication, the 
newness of this development inspires the chance 
that in the future a more secure solution could be 
discovered. 
 
 
IX.  FUTURE PROSPECTS 
 
Acceptability can be one of the most difficult 
hurdles when introducing a new authentication sys-
tem. A research study was conducted by Halevi et 
al. [21] to test how comfortable people felt giving 
their biometric data to a website. The experiment 
included 100 participants with 73% of them under 
24 years old. As this demographic is more likely to 
try new technology, biometric acceptability within 
this category is necessary for the success of an au-
thentication system. When participants were shown 
two mock websites, the familiar "Amazon" and a 
newly created "Amazin”, they were asked if they 
would be willing to share their fingerprints for a 
$50 discount for each site. Participants were also 
asked whether they had been victim to a computer 
hack in the past such as identity theft, malware, and 
viruses. It was discovered that people who had ex-
perienced some computer hack were much less 
likely to share their biometrics. Only 28% of partic-
ipants who had experienced a virus attack would 
provide their fingerprints. This metric is not surpris-
ing, as the willingness to share personal information 
often depends on whether a person has had that in-
formation compromised before. What is more inter-
esting is that only 56% of participants who did not 
experience an attack would provide fingerprints 
[21]. Despite not having experienced any malicious 
activity, people are still suspicious of giving out 
their biometric data, even when offered monetary 
gain. Considering this study was done with the 
more common fingerprint biometric, the likelihood 
users would be willing to share brainwave biomet-
rics is much lower, especially if personal infor-
mation can be deduced from this collection. 
A biometric authentication device will un-
doubtedly be met with skeptical users, particularly 
when the possibility of a computer hack is evermore 
present. Although biometric authentication has not 
reached extremely high acceptability, the growth of 
the industry will be a catalyst for new methods and 
higher use. The size of the biometrics market in the 
US is growing (Figure 7), and expected to increase 
rapidly over the next decade. The more biometric 
devices permeate through society, the more likely 
acceptability will increase, opening the door to new 
forms of biometrics, such as brainwave authentica-
tion. Coupled with the commerciality of EEG de-
vices and the societal need for security, brainwave 
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authentication is the next logical step. Once brain-
wave authentication has crossed the chasm to be a 
moderately accepted form of security, the next 
phase will see an expansion in research of continu-
ous authentication methods. No longer will login-
time security measures be enough for the technol-
ogy-driven world. The unique conscious enabled 
data the brain provides can offer the next level of 
security. Studies in this area are limited and ex-
tremely new, but as research in the brain, biomet-
rics, machine learning, and artificial intelligence 
progress, continuous authentication via brainwaves 
could come to fruition.   
 
 
Figure 7: From Statista [66] 
 
X.  CONCLUSION 
 
This paper discussed the possibilities of using 
brainwaves as a behavioral biometric for user au-
thentication. Through analysis of research studies, 
it has been shown that brainwave authentication can 
achieve accurate results above 96%, especially 
when implementing a multi-metric approach. The 
brain can offer a unique metric capable of standing 
as an authentication method, and as further progress 
is made in this research, it is possible continuous 
authentication methods could be introduced. The 
highly complex and personal data emitted by the 
brain, however, raises security concerns that cannot 
be ignored when pursuing brainwave authentica-
tion. The balance of accuracy and privacy will be 
paramount in this endeavor. 
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